THE MILITARYLAND GRANT ALONG THE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN FRONTIER
The Christian-Muslim frontier frequently acted as a barrier that separated religions, cultures, and societies from one another.B ut it was a permeable barrier in that ideas, commodities, and technology often passed through it. To demonstrate the precise mechanism of that permeability can be difficult to do. As Lynn White has remarked: ''No medievaltextdocuments with explicit words the amazing openness of the medievalE uropean mind to borrowings from alien cultures. . . .'' 1 It is fair to say that the prevailing historiographyh as tended to concentrate on the frontier as barrier and has tended to ignore its permeability.
The issues I am exploring in this paper are the antecedents and parallels to the Muscovite pomest'e system. The question I am asking is: did the grand princes, or whoevero riginated the program of military land grants in Muscovy, think it up on their own or did theyh av e an already existing model in mind? That is, was it an indigenous Muscovite development or was it the result of outside influence? Trying to determine 500 years after the event what was in the minds of those who did something may be futile. But, the exercise itself may be helpful in terms of gaining more understanding of Muscovite sources in relationship to those of the rest of the world.
When I begant his research, I thought I understood what I was about to study.Ifound, instead, that my former understanding of Western ''feudalism'' wasnot a coherent one, that my former understanding of the difference between votchina and pomest'e did not correspond to the evidence, and that the Muslim military land grant practice called iqt . ā ' is remarkably similar,b oth structurally and functionally,t oo ur more recent concepts of what landholding in Muscovy wasl ike. What is the reason for this similarity? Is it possible (likely) that concepts of landholding spread in the same way that technological innovations, such as paper and gunpowder,did? Or are the similarities merely superficial?
My hypothesis is that, when Muscovy acquired an empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, just as when the Muslims acquired their empire in the seventh and eighth centuries, the influx of newl ands to be governed created an overload on the central state administration. Military land grants that incorporated administration of the frontier regions along with maintenance of military personnel was the answer in both cases. But I propose that the Muscovites did not arrive atthat solution independently.T heyborrowed the concepts and techniques of the Muslim iqt . ā '.Ido not have ane xact description of howt his borrowing occurred, but the similarities between the systems are too striking for us to accept the presupposition that the Muscovite system developed in a cultural vacuum or event hat it was somehowb orrowed from the West. Furthermore, I hypothesize that the various systems of military land grants found in medieval Europe, Byzantium, and the Ottoman Empire were but variants of iqt . ā ',b orrowed and modified to fit local needs. *** But, first, let us clarify what we are trying to compare. Pomest'e is generally regarded as a form of conditional land tenure that was introduced into Muscovy in the late fifteenth century.I tp rovided the basis for the system of serfdom, which in turn held the autocratic system and the Russian ruling class together until 1861. 2 Our understanding of exactly what pomest'e wasi ss till changing. The traditional viewo f pomest'e wass ummed up by V.O .K liuchevskii who contrasted it with votchina.K liuchevskii saw pomest'e as being personal, conditional, and temporary as opposed to votchina,w hich he sawa s being was hereditary,n on-conditional, and permanent. 3 To these criteria, we might add the English legald istinction between possession and ownership, i.e., holding or occupancyvs. legalright of proprietorship.
Historians often cite the Testament of Ivan I from the early fourteenth century as the first example of conditional land tenure in Muscovy.I vanIg rants a It is not clear whyo nly Vasilii is mentioned. Also we should not assume that, because land could be taken awayfor lack of service, it could be held as long as service was proferred. Other evidence indicates that land could be taken for any, or no articulated, reason. We should consider the possibility that the Iaroslavl' boyars, the Tver' votchina holders, and Vasilii constitute a special case. Here votchina is treated as though it were conditional.
It is important to define what we mean by ''pomest'e'' based on the direct testimonyo fp rimary sources rather than on what we suppose them to say or what we want them to say.T he characteristics of a votchina seem to be less in doubt than those of pomest'e.B ut recent research by Alekseeva nd Kopanev, Degtiarev, Hammond, and Kobrin suggests more similarities than historians have traditionally acknowledged. 8 Fore xample, both kinds of land reverted to the grand prince when there were no male heirs. Both could be confiscated for lack of service or for anyreason. Neither was' 'conditional''inthe sense that, as long as service was proferred, it could not be taken away. Pomest'e could remain with a non-servitor.B oth could be donated to monasteries (alienation). Both could be exchanged for the same type of land (in unequal amounts), that is, pomest'e for pomest'e and votchina for votchina.B esides that, pomest'e could be exchanged for votchina and votchina for pomest'e on condition that the pomest'e would become votchina and the votchina would become pomest'e. 9 Both could be bequeathed to one'ss ons, brothers, and cousins, and both were considered familial lands. 10 In other words, as Hammond argues, pomest'e was hereditary from the beginning. But what does ''hereditary''m ean? Could a non-servitor ''inherit''the pomest'e of a deceased relative?D id a servitor'sson have the option of first refusal on claiming the land if he proferred service? It may be that pomest'e could be inherited but needed the approvalo ft he ruler. would not have his father's pomest'e added to his when his father died. Hammond goes on to point out that, when pomest'e estates begantoshowarelatively high rate of turnoverand confiscation in the second half of the sixteenth century, votchina also showed an increase in its rate of turnoverand confiscation. 11 Since the change in the rates of turnoverf or pomest'e corresponds with the change in rates of turnoverf or votchina,t his means that theyw ere probably being treated by the central state administration in pretty much the same way.I naddition, we should also consider the testimonyofRichard Chancellor from the late sixteenth century:
If anym an behave himself valiantly in the field to the contention of the emperor, he bestoweth upon him in recompense of his service some farm or so much ground as he and his may live upon, which notwithstanding after his death returneth again to the emperor if he die without a male issue. Foralthough his daughters be never so many, yet no part of that inheritance comes to them, except peradventure the emperor of his goodness give some portion of the land amongst them to bestow them withal. As for the man, whosoeverhebe, that is in this sort rewarded by the emperor'sl iberality,h ei sb ound in a great sum to maintain so manys oldiers for the war,when need shall require, as that land in the opinion of the emperor is able to maintain. And all those to whom anyl and falls by inheritance are in no better condition, for if theydie without anymale issue all their lands falls into the hands of the emperor. 12 Several significant points stand out. First, the tsar givesthe land (pomest'e)asa reward for service, not to acquire the service of the individual. Second, the tsar at that time was under no obligation to grant anyp art of the land to female descendents. Third, although Chancellor states the pomeshchik is obliged to provide soldiers, he does not explicitly state that the land will be forfeit if the pomeshchik does not provide soldiers. The Military Service Decree of 1556 does state that the size of the pomest'e will be reduced to correspond more closely to the amount of service proferred. Significantly,the penalty for no service is not confiscation of the pomest'e butam onetary payment to provide an equivalent number of men with full equipment and horses. 13 Finally, votchina is treated the same way pomest'e is when there is no male heir.
Differences did exist between pomest'e and votchina in practice. A votchina could be givena wayb yt he holder to anyone else in service of the 11 Hammond, ''The History of the Novgorodian Pomest'e,'' pp. 48 Muscovite prince, whereas pomest'e could only be givent om onasteries. This difference may have been the origin of the idea that monasteries had to contribute cavalrymen to the tsar'sa rmy.A nd a votchina could be sold for cash, whereas a pomest'e could only be exchanged for other pomest'e land. Initially, land transactions did not have tob er egistered with the secular authorities. Pomest'e lands signified a greater degree of regulation by the central state administration. As the state begant oe xpand its regulatory powers overl and transactions, the Church challenged the state'sr ight to regulate land gifts to monasteries. Significantly,donation of votchina lands was an issue but donation of pomest'e lands was not. The reason for this is that donation of pomest'e lands wasallowed, except in explicitly specific cases. 14 *** As one might imagine, historians have advanced several theories on the origins of the pomest'e system. Those who argue that it is an indigenous phenomenon see it as a specific solution to a specific problem. Jerome Blum, although stating that ''conditional tenure became fairly common in the later fourteenth century,''a sserted that ''[s]ervice tenure did not become widespread, however, until the sixteenth century.''I ti su nclear what distinction, if any, he wasm aking between ''fairly common''a nd ''widespread.'' Nor is it clear whether he saw' 'conditional tenure''a sb eing different from ''service tenure.'' Blum rejected the idea that service tenure existed in KievanR us' and sawi ta s originating during the period of Mongol overlordship. But he also rejected the idea that service tenure was borrowed from outside Muscovy: ''It is, of course, entirely conceivable that the idea could have been borrowed from abroad, but it seems most probable that it was an indigenous phenomenon, rising out of the needs of the time.'' Blum does not say whyhethinks it is ''most probable.'' He went on to state: ''Givent he problems of contemporary political and economic life, it seems a natural sort of solution for the princes and great landlords to adopt. ' 18 The tribute to the Tatar khan, for example, was apparently paid in silver. 19 Besides not pointing to anye vidence that the scarcity of moneywas the cause of bestowing pomest'e,S zeftel, in effect, seems to be saying this: the grand prince did not have enough moneytopay military service men to administer and defend newl ands, so he paid them by allowing them to administer and defend those same lands that he did not have the moneytopay them for administering and defending in the first place.
In relation to service tenure, Richard Hellie has written: ''The assumption has usually been that the Russians could not have come up with the idea themselves and so must have borrowed it from some place else. '' 20 Cherepnin provided a class struggle explanation when he argued that pomest'e wast he result of the conflict between the boyars, on the one side, and the grand prince and the dvorianstvo,o nt he other.A ccording to this view, the dvoriane were paid with pomest'e estates taken awayfrom boyar votchiny. 21 The consensus viewo fS oviet historiographys aw pomest'e created by the confiscation of princely holdings and the giving of them as pomest'ia to the former servitors of these princes. 22 However, N.E .N osova rgues against the idea of ''democratization''o fl andholding. 23 The need of Russian historians during the Soviet period to encode their research in conformity with the Marxist views of the Party elite makes much of their discussion of service land tenure irrelevant for our purposes. Manyoftheir generalizations simply do not correspond to the available source evidence. 24 There have been numerous attempts to tie in developments in Muscovy with those in Western Europe of the time or earlier.I nr eg ard to service land tenure, perhaps the most sustained argument was provided by N. P.P avlov-Silvanskii. He tried to refute the idea that the medievalR ussian social structure wasd ifferent from that which prevailed in the medievalW est or that it was unique in anyw ay. 25 As I will attempt to showb elow, much of Pavlov-Silvanskii'sc omparison is based on an erroneous understanding of medieval' 'feudalism.'' Thus, his argument and those of others who see a connection of it with Muscovite land tenure fall by default.
Other historians, as Blum pointed out, see a Mongol connection for Muscovite service land tenure. In 1953, George Vernadskyasserted: became the pattern for the subsequent relationship between the tsar and the nobility at large. An important source of the power of the Moscowtsar was his control of the landed estates of the army officers through the pomestie system. And as has been said, it is in the landholdings of the grand ducal dvoriane of the Mongol period that at least some of the roots of the pomestie system may be discerned. Thus, while that system assumed definite shape only in the post-Mongol periodin the 16th century-the Mongol age may be called its incubation period. 26 Fourteen years earlier,V ernadskyd escribed what seems to be a different influence: ''The institution of ikta... might have been partly instrumental for the growth of the pomestie régime in Russia.'' 27 But, in the footnote, he modified that statement: ''Both the Byzantine πρόνοια and the Ottoman timar might also have served as patterns for the Russian pomestie. ' The idea that pomest'e derivedf rom Byzantine pronoia has been expressed in the historiographya tl east since the mid-nineteenth century.K .A . Nevolin argued that the resemblance of pomest'e to Byzantine pronoia (topion) showed Sophia'sinfluence on Ivan III. 29 Miliukov noted the seeming simultaneous appearance of Ottoman timar and Muscovite pomest'e,a nd he also noted their similarity with Byzantine pronoia. 30 But Miliukov isn ot clear about how the system entered the Ottoman Empire, South Slavic areas, and Muscovy at the same time. Subsequently,Miliukov argued against Pavlov-Silvanskii'sviewthat pomest'e wass imilar to western European feudalism. Instead, he pointed out the similarity with both Byzantine pronoia and Muslim iqt . ā '. 31 He did not speculate on the mechanism of its entry. Other historians have pointed out the similarity of pomest'e with the already existing system of kormlenie. 32 Acomparison of the following twocharters, one for kormlenie,the other for pomest'e,shows their similarity:
Kormlenie Charter I, Grand Prince Ivan Vasil'evich of all Rus', have granted to Ivan son of Andrei Plemiannikov [the villages of] Pushka and Osintsovo asakormlenie with the right to administer justice [pravda] and to collect taxes on the purchase, sale, and branding of horses [piatno] . And you, all the people of this volost',honor him and obey him, and he will govern you and judge you and will conduct your affairs in every wayastheywere conducted heretofore. 33 Pomest'e Charter (January 12, 1546) I, Ivan Vasil'evich, grand prince of all Rus', grant to Grisha, son of Ivan Zhedrinskii, of Nizhnii-Novgorod, a third portion of the village of Frolovskoe in the Berezopolskii stan of the Nizhnii-Novgorod uezd,which formerly belonged to Eremei, son of Matfei Pagozskii; and also the obrok-paying hamlet of Kuchino in Strelitsa, which belonged to Rodia Kuchin. Since-[omission in original] this syn boiarskii died leaving behind no wife or children, and his land was not givena sapomest'e to anyone, thus I, the grand prince, grant it as a pomest'e with everything that belonged to this third of the village and to the hamlet as of old. As for the peasants who shall live onhis land, in that third of the village and in the hamlet, our namestniki in Nizhnii-Novgorod and the volosteli and their tiuny shall not sit in judgment overt hem for anything except murder and robbery with material evidence; Grisha himself or whoeverh ed esignates shall administer and judge his own peasants. And if there should be a mixed trial between his peasants and the inhabitants of the town or volost',t hen our Nizhnii-Novgorod namestniki and volosti and their tiuny shall sit in judgment overhis peasants together with Grisha or his manager; and the court fees shall be equally divided between them. If anyone lodges a complaint against Grisha or his manager,then I myself, the grand prince, or my boiarin vvedenoi [commissioned boyar] will sit in judgment. And the obrok from his obrokpaying hamlet shall be paid according to the books [ revenue from them. 35 But, as is clear from existing kormlenie charters, the namestnik,whether Christian or Muslim, had full power of administration within the kormlenie area. The pomeshchik,l iket he namestnik,w as to administer the territory,b ut there is no mention of his providing military service as a condition of the grant. This charter delineates the administrative duties of the pomeshchik from that of the prince'sm en, the namestniki, volosteli,a nd tiuny. The pomeshchik wast oj udge all matters involving his peasants except murder and robbery,w hich were the only twoc rimes the prince'sm en would judge. It may be significant that here we see an example of the dual administration characteristic of Mongol-dominated lands. Are there examples of such dual administration in the West, or in Byzantium, or in the pre-Mongol Middle East? 36 Do we have a charter that stipulates military service as a condition of the grant? Or is the amount of military service imposed afterward?
Other historians have pointed to the abuses under the kormlenie system. But Crummey, following Dewey, questioned the extent of such abuses. 37 Dewey asserted that the namestniki maintained their power at least until the 1555 military reform, and then evenafter as voevody.H edisagreed with those who argue that the namestniki had their power stripped from them due to corruption. Instead, Deweya rgued that the need for more efficient revenue collection was the decisive reason for the reforms. 38 It would appear then that the responsibilities of the namestniki declined as those of the pomeshchiki rose. deriving from Imperial Roman institutions of clientage and patronage. 40 Heinrich Brunner sawi ts origins in the intrusion of the Muslims north of the Pyrenees, which precipitated a fusion of the German and Roman institutions. His argument is that Charles Martel had to raise a fighting force to meet the Muslim attack. Martel confiscated church and monastic lands and gav e them to military men for service. 41 Another theory suggests that Norse invasions required armored knights to protect villages. 42 Yeta nother theory was proposed by Lynn White who argued for the significance of the importation of the stirrup from Central Asia. According to White, the stirrup was a technological innovation introduced to the Franks in the early eighth century that gav e an advantage to the armored knight on horseback. But the knight needed land to maintain his armor, horse, and stirrup; thus, feudalism was invented. 43 Finally,o ther historians have seen feudalism as an evolutionary phase in the natural development of all societies. 44 One notable characteristic of all theories about the origins of feudalism is the presumption that it was an indigenous development free from practices outside Europe. Fore xample, Donald Kelleyp hrased the question of feudalism'sorigins this way: ''was 'feudalism' a peculiarly European institution, or is it a stage in the development of every nation?'' 45 The variety of descriptions of ''feudalism''i sl egion and generally reflect the prefigurations of the describer.A tt he beginning of this century,M aitland summed up the vagueness of definitions of ''feudalism'':
Nowwere an examiner to ask who introduced the feudal system into England? one very good answer,i fp roperly explained, would be Henry Spelman, and if there followed the question, what was the feudal system? a good answer to that would be, an early essay in comparative jurisprudence. . . . If my examiner went on with his questions and asked me, when did the feudal system attain its most perfect development? I should answer,about the middle of the last century. 46 The phrase [feudal system] has thus become for us so large and vague that it is quite possible to maintain that of all countries England was the most, or for the matter of that the least, feudalized; that William the Conqueror introduced, or for the matter of that suppressed, the feudal system. 47 More recently,R ichardson and Sayles have suggested that ''feudalism''i sl ittle ''more than an arbitrary pattern imposed by modern writers upon men long dead and events long past''and theyadvise that ''[a]n adjective soambiguous and so misleading is best avoided. '' 48 In no uncertain terms, Elizabeth A. R. Brown pilloried those who try to use their own concepts of ''feudalism''t oe xplain the source testimony:
The variety of definitions of feudalism and the limitations imposed on their relevance are confusing. Equally disconcerting is the pervasive tendencyonthe part of those who use the word to personify,r eify,a nd, to coin twow ords, occasionally 'bacterialize,'a nd even' lunarize' the abstractions. Howo ften does one read that feudalism, likeavirus, spread from one area to another,orthat, later on, it slowly waned. In as ingle study feudalism is assigned a dazzling array of roles. It is found giving birth, being extremely virile, having vitality,being strong, knowing a long tradition, being successfully transplanted, surviving, being replaced, teetering, being routed, declining and falling, and finally dead and in its grave. 49 One of the points Brown makes is that, while there seems to be a consensus about ''feudalism''when using it as a pedagogical device to teach students, there is no consensus when it comes to using ''feudalism''as' 'an intellectual tool''in studying society. 50 Nonetheless, Maitland and other historians seem to go through a revolving door of castigating definitions of feudalism that imply a system, then of proceeding to formulate their own systemic definitions. Maitland used his assessment of the inadequacies of previous definitions to advance his own: ''a state of society in which all or a great part of public rights and duties are inextricably interwovenw ith the tenure of land, in which the whole government system-financial, 46 military,judicial-is part of the lawofprivate property. '' 51 Yet, that definition is also so vague that it could, with some modification, be applied to almost any sedentary society,including the present-day United States.
One of the leading scholars of feudalism, Carl Stephenson, has presented his own model this way:
Ignoring for the moment all possible exceptions, we may say that a vassal was preeminently a gentleman and a warrior,p ledged as such to support his lord on the battlefield and in other honorable ways. This wasapersonal obligation which feudal tenure could modify but neverset aside. The fact that, by the eleventh century, av assal normally livedo nh is own estate meant only that his attendance upon his lord was restricted to particular occasions-when, thanks to his enhanced position, his service would be especially valuable. Nor did the concession of a fief relieve the lord of personal responsibility towards his vassal. The faithless lord, as well as the faithless vassal, was known as a felon, and felonyo fo ne sort or another remained prominent in all systems of feudal law. . . . 52 Could a lord be a felon in Rus'? Could the grand prince, as lord, be a felon? Here seems to be a place where Muscovy under the Daniilovichi differed from Stephenson'sm odel of western European ''feudalism.'' Asl ong as a grand prince was considered legitimate, he could not be considered a felon. 53 The grand princes determined their own lawbyfollowing the precedents of their predecessors or by establishing a newp recedent in agreement with the Church and the boyars. 54 Stephenson goes on to claim:
In actual practice we knowt hat, evenb efore the close of the ninth century,i tw as customary for fiefs to pass from father to son; and that, within another hundred years or so, a fief was regularly described as hereditary.F or reasons stated above, however, such inheritance is found to have been merely the renewalo faf eudal contract, to which each of the parties, the lord and the vassal, had to give personal assent. When av assal died, his fief reverted to the lord and really ceased to be a fief at all until another vassal had been invested with it. In case the vassal had no heir,the reversion was called escheat, and the lord was free to keep the dead man's estate or to regrant it to whomsoeverhepleased. In case the vassal had an heir,the lord was legally obliged to accept his as the newh older. Another striking peculiarity of feudal tenure wasprimogeniture, the rule that a fief should pass intact to the eldest son. No such form of inheritance was known either to Roman or to Germanic law, and allodial property continued to be shared by the children of a deceased owner.T he fact that a fief was legally indivisible seems to prove that it was considered a public office rather than a piece of land. 56 Here there is another crucial difference with Muscovy.W hat Stephenson is describing are political arrangements between independent contractors. The vassal entered the service of the lord by virtue of an agreement, sometimes reciprocal. In Muscovy,s ervitors were already in the service of the grand prince-no independent agreement or reciprocity was involved. The grand prince could takethe land back or leave the land with the servitor as he desired.
But not all lord-vassal relationships in the West were between such independent contractors as Stephenson describes. Clearly,t hings are not as theya ppear in this category.S omewhere along the line historians have made the assumption that ''conditional''l and tenure in Muscovy must conform to the ''feudal''m odel, whatevert hat historian understood by it. But service land tenure neither in western Europe nor in Muscovy conforms to anysuch model. Even Stephenson admitted:
Although men in the Middle Ages were quite familiar with vassals and fiefs and with vassalage and feudal tenure, theyapparently did not think in terms of a broad feudal theory-a set of feudal principles by which to construct a social and political framework. 57 Furthermore, Stephenson warned against accepting the conventional wisdom about feudalism: ''I am inclined to agree with those scholars who find the ordinary remarks about feudalism in the abstract either so vague as to be historically useless or so inaccurate as to be historically dangerous.'' 58 Forexample, the conventional wisdom states that vassals receivedl and from the lord in return for 55 Stephenson military service. This is the way textbooks present it: ''The relationship between lord (suzerain) and vassal, between the bestower and receivero ft he fief, is the heart of the medievalfeudal system.'' 59 Yet, Stephenson writes:
The status of vassal. . . could always be acquired, with or without the prospect of a fief, merely by performing homage and swearing fealty.A nd solely in this way could one become a vassal. Although fiefs might be declared hereditary,vassalage wasnev erinherited. 60 Such a formulation also would distinguish Western lord-vassal relations from relations in Muscovy where service obligations were hereditary.F urthermore, according to Stephenson, swearing fealty was not enough to indicate vassalage:
The primary and decisive element in the ceremonyw as homage, for in the twelfth century,a si nt he Frankish periods it was always possible for one man to swear fealty to another without becoming his vassal. In other words, although anyvassal could properly be styled a fidelis,all fideles were not vassals. 61 In short, there does not appear to be such a thing as a ''typical''f eudal grant. But, we can say this. There are at least three components that often showu pi n western European medievalp olitical relations: (1) homage; (2) vassalage; and (3) land granted for the maintenance of a cavalryman (horse, armor,s hield, weapons, etc.). Of these components, only the first, homage, is necessary to what Stephenson calls ''feudalism.'' But Richardson and Sayles concluded that homage was not typical, or evenas ignificant part, of grants in England. 62 Stephenson himself admitted that the other twocomponents, vassalage and land grant, are optional and that theya lso appear in non-''feudal''r elations. For example, a king could hire a knight (vassal) for a particular battle, thus, treating the knight as a soldier of fortune who owed no homage and receivedn ol and (a straight ''cash''f or service deal). And there were kings who would grant land for the maintenance of a cavalryman, although the king claimed the cavalryman owed service as a matter of fact, not as the result of homage extended by an independent contractor.F or example, Carolingian edicts frequently refer to the fact that all freemen owe military service. 63 tion seems to be similar to that in Muscovy under the Daniilovichi. 64 Yet, if all three components of political relations in the medievalW est were optional, then in what sense does the term ''feudal''hav e anymeaning?
Basically,w es hould taket he advice of Richardson and Sayles and disregard all definitions of ''feudalism,'' including Marxist, as well as the views of all historians who see it as a single system. There was no ''system''o fl ord-vassal relations as such in the West. Each lord had his own individual relationship with each of his vassals. These ''feudal''r elationships were at times little more than the relationships that members of a street gang in anyl arge American city have to the gang leader.I naddition, the terms ''feudal''and ''feudalism''are redolent with negative connotations. Theya re often used in the same sense that terms like' 'Caesaropapism,'' ''Oriental Despotism,'' and ''totalitarian,'' are used-to categorize what is being described as something that should be disliked. As a result, I propose that anystatements about Western ''feudal''practice be accompanied by specific reference to when and where one thinks such a practice existed and according to what documents one is basing one'sstatements on.
The comparison with Byzantine pronoia likewise yields little in the way of direct influence. Va silievr ejected the comparison of pronoia with kormlenie because, according to him, ''kormlenie wasnot connected with the possession of aterritory and meant only the administration of a town or province with the right to collect revenues for the profit of the administrator.''I nstead, Vasilievs aw a closer connection between pronoia and pomest'e,which he defined as ''an estate held temporarily on condition of discharging military service, which speedily assumed an hereditary character.'' 65 Va silievd id not have the advantage of recent research that we have,s oh ew as operating under the prevailing assumption that pomest'e wasn ot hereditary from the beginning. But this is not the only point on which his comparison may be faulty.E nsslin defined pronoia by comparing it with ''feudalism'': ''By the pronoia (provision) landed property,to which was attached the obligation of supplying soldiers, was granted to superior officers, and the income from these estates belonged to them during their lifetime, but could not be inherited; this arrangement bears a certain resemblance to the Western feudal system.'' 66 Ensslin seems to be in disagreement with Vasiliev when he says pronoia wasn ot hereditary.T he resemblance he thought he saw with Western ''feudalism''i sf aulty because grants of land in the West at the time were frequently inherited.
According to Ernst H. Kantorowicz, pronoia wasi ntroduced in the mideleventh century.I twas a result of the Ducas dynasty'sbeginning ''to build up a civilian aristocracyo fs cholars and great officials within the capital. .. and to play offthat newaristocracyagainst the military aristocracy,'' the strategoi,who were ''provincial commanders and governors of the themes. ...'' 67 In order to reduce the power of the military aristocracy, the pronoia ''estates were given both to high officers of the state or army and to monasteries and private persons also. Theyw ere giveni np ermanent administration as a reward for services. The grants differed from simple donations in that the pronoia land was absolutely bound to the recipient, the pronoetes;t hat he receivedi tf or a definite period only,usually for life; that he could not sell the pronoia estate; and that it wasnot hereditary.'' 68 Kantorowicz saw pronoia as being used to end the power of the provincial generals, which was based on a peasant militia, and to regain central, civilian control of the military.T hus, both the circumstances and the goals of the military land grant in Byzantium differed from such grants elsewhere in that it was directed against the existing military leaders and often was giventonon-military personages. The claim by some historians is that pomest'e wasdirected against the boyars with their hereditary estates. Whether or not we accept that conjecture, we must acknowledge that ''civilians''w ere not given pomest'e.A nd it was not an attempt by a civilian elite of scholars and great officials to break the power of the provincial military.T his strong non-military aspect of pronoia would seem to refute the contention of those who assert that Ottoman timar wasbased on it. 69 When we compare pomest'e with Ottoman timar,wefind some significant points of similarity.I nalcik described timar this way:
Above all else the timar system was intended to provide troops for the sultan's army,bymaintaining a large, centrally controlled cavalry force. The timar-holding sipahîk ept his own horse; he was armed with a bow, sword, shield, lance and mace, and if his timar income exceeded a certain sum he wore armour.F or each three thousand akç es of timar income, a sipahîh ad to provide one cebelü-a fully armed horseman; beys provided a cebelü for each fivethousand akç es. . . The main points described here-of serving to maintain a cavalry force on the income of the estate and a certain set number of horsemen to be provided according to the size of the estate-correspond with the evidence we have for pomest'e.W ed on ot have enough evidence to say whether some aspects of timar that Inalcik describes also occurred under pomest'e,i ncluding: the granting of land to a servitor after a petition by his commanding officer to the ruler (Sultan); the giving of a first-time applicant for a land grant a certificate (tezkere), which he presented to the ruler; and the authority of beylerbeyis to grant subsequent diplomas. 71 A timar-holder,l ikeapomeshchik could not be dispossessed without the order of the ruler.A lso, like pomest'e,t he Ottoman timar system was highly centralized. Inalcik contrasts this centralization with the tendencyf or Western medievalp olitical-military relations to be decentralized.
In the following passage Inalcik describes certain other aspects of timar that we could argue correspond with pomest'e:
To beeligible for a timar a man had to be from the military class; it was absolutely forbidden to grant timars to the reâ yâ. A son inherited military status if his father were of military class or the kul of a sultan or bey. The Ottomans also accepted as military class the members of the equivalent caste in newly conquered states, and in this way manyC hristian fief-holders became timar-holding sip âhîs.I nt ime, theyo rt heir sons accepted Islam. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a large part of the timar-holding cavalry was, likethe Janissary corps, composed of slaves. Only those Muslim Turks who had volunteered and performed outstanding services on campaign or on the frontier,orelse the Turkish followers of frontier beys, could receive timars. 72 As with timar,apomest'e-holder had to be from the military class. The son of a pomeshchik could inherit the pomest'e and mutatis mutandis non-Christians (usually Muslims) could hold military land grants in Muscovy just as Christians could hold them in the Ottoman Empire. 73 In time, the sons of the Muslim pomeshchiki became Christian just as the sons of Christian sipahîs became 71 Lambton pointed out that under the Buyids ''a provincial governor could distribute the area under his jurisdiction as iqt . ā 's, but he did this as an official of the state, and not because the area formed part of his private domain.'' Ann K. S. Lambton, ''Reflections on the Iqt . ā overitbythe petty territorial princes, who were the de facto holders of the land. This conception begant os upersede both the earlier Islamic theory,w hich regarded all land which had no owner as the property of all Muslims and permitted its alienation by the imā m only in the interests of the community,a nd the theory of the steppe, which regarded the ruling Khā n as holding the land as the representative ofhis people.'' 80 Lambton pointed out that besides iqt . ā ' granted to members of the ruling family,t here was also military,a dministrative,a nd personal estate iqt . ā '.S he described the administrative iqt . ā ' as ''in effect a provincial government''a nd sawar esemblance between it and the ''the earlier assignments made by the Arabs and known as tu'ma.''T he distinction between administrative and military iqt . ā ' ''tended to be obscured because the 'administrative' iqt . ā ' had by Seljū qtimes become militarized. '' 83 In Muscovy,the progression may have been from administrative iqt . ā ' (kormlenie)t oac ombination of military and administrative iqt . ā ' (pomest'e), if we can speak in those terms. However, wes hould keep in mind that the namestnik could also perform military service.
David Morgandescribed four types of iqt . ā ' during the Seljū qperiod:
There was, first, the grant by the sult . āno fap rivate estate, a pension or an allowance to an individual; secondly,agrant made to a member of the Seljū qfamily for his or her proper maintenance; thirdly,agrant of land or the revenue of land to an amīr in lieu of salary or in return for specified military service (the 'military' iqt . ā '); fourthly,agrant which was in effect equivalent to appointment as a provincial governor (the 'administrative' iqt . ā '). '' 84 Not only do we have examples of all four of these same types of land grants in Muscovy-1. grants to members of ruling family for their maintenance 2. personal immunities 3. administrative (kormlenie)4 .m ilitary-but we also see the merger of administrative and military grants within pomest'e. discussed mainly the second category-those having ''a predominantly military character and which usually conferred upon their holders powers of local government-because these constituted the basic element in Ayyubid provincial administration.'' 88 Humphreys stressed that iqt . ā ' did not establish a tie of personal fealty between man and man. There is no evidence of anykind to suggest that the sovereign and his muqta' formally undertook ab ody of mutual obligations to each other,n or did the latter swear a specific oath of fidelity to the prince on the occasion of his receiving an iqta'.I ti so fc ourse true that when a newp rince ascended the throne, he had his amirs and officials swear allegiance to him, but that is a different institution altogether.A n iqta' was conceded through a decree (manshur)issued by the prince, in the same manner as anyo ther office of state would be conceded. The muqta',f or all that he often appeared to be and behavedlikea western feudatory,was in reality simply another official, a delegate of the prince with no legalstatus of his own. Among the Ayyubids of Syria, as among their Seljukid and Zangid predecessors, the iqta' was understood simply as an administrative mechanism aimed at ensuring an adequate financial basis for an effective military machine. In essence it was as impersonal as anyo ther arrangement for provincial government and military administration might have been. 89 Humphreys' point here should confirm for us that pomest'e arrangements were closer to iqt . ā ' than either were to medievalw estern European landholding arrangements.
As with iqt . ā ' under the Mamluks, I cannot go into iqt . ā ' under the Buyids. But for discussions of iqt . ā ' under the Buyids, see articles by Tsugitaka Satō 90 and C. E. Bosworth. 91 The more important question for our purposes is: Do we have evidence of pre-Buyid forms of iqt . ā '? 92 Claims were made by those who instituted iqt . ā ' under the Buyids in the second half of the tenth century that the practice originated with Muhammed. 93 We might try to dismiss such claims out of hand as merely an attempt to justify an innovation with an appeal to tradition (in this case, the Prophet himself). However, Frede 98 L/ okkeg aard also compared early Islamic iqt . ā ' with Western ''feudalism''and asserted that both had a common origin in Roman taxfarming (locatio). 99 Yet, he does not discuss any' 'mechanism''b yw hich locatio could have reemerged in the twoa reas almost simultaneously after a hiatus of several hundred years.
Significantly the military land grant shows up early in Muslim Spain. According to Joseph O'Callaghan: ''Early in the eighth century the Syrian junds were authorized to settle in certain districts of al-Andulus where theyh ad the usufruct of agricultural properties on condition that theyp erform military service when summoned. These rights and obligations passed by hereditary right to their descendents.'' 100 Bernard Lewis described these military land grants giventothe Syrian soldiers this way:
In 741 the Berbers were strong enough to stage a general revolt in Spain against the Arabs. The Caliph sent an Arab and largely Syrian army which arrivedin742 after a long and adventurous journey, under the command of Balj ibn Bishr.I t soon defeated the Berbers and in reward receivedt he Mediterranean coastlands of Spain in fief. These newc olonists from Syria were settled on the same plan as in Syria itself, and a Spanish district was allocated to the men of each of the Syrian Junds (military districts)-Damascus in Elvira, the Jordan at Malaga, Palestine in Sidonia, Hims in Seville, Qinnasrin in Jaen. The army of Egypt held Beja and Murcia. These Arab fief-holders were liable for military service on the summons of the government in Cordova,the Arab capital. Otherwise theywere supposed to live ont heir lands. But the Arabs had not yet taken to agriculture, and the fiefholders for the most part preferred to settle in the chief towns of the districts in which their lands were situated and to live onthe revenues theydrewfrom Spanish serfs or sharecroppers who cultivated their estates. Theyformed a newtownpopulation, an Arab warrior caste living on their revenues and known as Shā mīs,orSyrians, to distinguish them from the older settlers who had come with the first invasion. 101 YetCollins pointed to an evenearlier example that relates to our question. In 713, 'Abd al-Azīz ibn Mū sāmade a treaty ''with a certain Theodemis, lord of sevent owns and their associated lands in the south-east of the peninsula.'' Collins writes: ''The same process, which allowed for the maximizing of the military potential of the Arab armies and the greatest rapidity of expansion, was also applied in Spain,'' and that process is evident in the text of the treaty. Among the stipulations was the payment of a tribute. Collins states that this was ay early per capita tribute: ''This consisted of one dinar (the Arab silver coin, though probably here indicating a weight of precious metal), four measures of wheat, four of barley, four jugsful of grapejuice, four of vinegar, ten of honey and twoo fo il per head.'' 102 Collins disagreed with Joaquin Vallvé who stated that the stipulated amounts were to be paid to each member of the Arab army. 103 If, however, Vallvé is correct that the allotment is per soldier,then we find parallel cases in Muscovy.T he White LakeCharter of 1488 stipulates the amount of subsistence payments for namestniki.E ach tax unit was to provide: a half carcass of meat or two altyns;ten loavesofbread or ten dengi;acartload of hay or two altyns.A nd on St. Peter'sDay (June 29 O.S.), namestniki were to receive a ram or eight dengi;ten loavesofbread or ten dengi. 104 Likewise, an administrative charter of June 4, 1536, stipulates similar allotments for the namestnik on the three feast days of Christmas, Easter,and St. Peter'sDay. 105 So the comparison of Muscovite practice with pre-Buyid iqt . ā ' seems to hold up. This suggests that iqt . ā ',a sp racticed by the Muslims from the eighth through at least the fifteenth century had certain consistent characteristics, and these same characteristics showupinMuscovite military land grant practices.
Howt hen does iqt . ā ' compare with western European landholding? Morganhas pointed out that there are superficial similarities between the twoinstitutions. For example, both ''provided a means whereby the ruler could raise a military force of substantial size without the unacceptable expense of maintaining a large standing army.''B ut he finds the differences between the twotobe' 'more striking.'' Morgand iffered from Humphreys and other scholars in that he saw iqt . ā ' as ''simply a bureaucratic device''a nd that it was not ''basic to the whole structure of society.''T his seems to be true only in certain isolated cases, whereas the importance of iqt . ā ' to the social structure of the majority of Muslim societies, as pomest'e wasi nM uscovy,h as been well established. But Morgan reminds us that medievalw estern European internal political relations ''arose. . . ruler. 107 It does not seem appropriate to call the grant ''conditional''ifthe grand prince could takea wayt he land for anyr eason at anyt ime, unless we mean ''conditional''onthe will of the ruler,not on whether the recipient does or does not do something. When we see land taken awayf rom a pomeshchik,w em ay have been assuming that it was for lack of service. Both Brunner and White credited Charles Martel with introducing the concept of service land tenure for maintaining cavalrymen into western Europe. This introduction would have occurred overt wo centuries before we have official documentation that iqt . ā ' appeared among the Buyids but 90 to 100 years after 'Umar ibn al-Khattab was Caliph. White, after investigating various assertions that the stirrup was introduced into Europe earlier,a rgued that ''[w]e must. . . return to the viewofthe older Germanic archaeologists that stirrups first appeared in the West some time in the early eighth century.'' 108 White, furthermore, asserted that ''it was the Franks alone-presumably led by Charles Martel'sg enius-who fully grasped the possibilities inherent in the stirrup. ...'' 109 That is, Charles Martel realized the need for the cavalrymen to maintain their stirrups, etc., through having land to exploit. Thus, he secularized church lands to grant conditionally to his cavalrymen.
However, wek nowt hat the Arabs had the stirrup before the Franks. According to al-Mubarrad, a ninth-century author,t he first iron stirrups were ordered to be made by al-Muhallab in 694. 110 White asserts that al-Muhallab borrowed the concept of the stirrup from the Azraqites of central Persia, against whom he was campaigning: ''the Arabs entered Iran without the stirrup for their horses. Wem ay conclude that the Muslims first appropriated it in A.D. 694 in Persia, whither it must recently have come from Turkestan, since it had been unknown in the Sassanian realm.'' 111 But the sources do not support White's contention that the Arabs did not have the stirrup before 694. Fore xample, the Shroud of St. Carilefus, a seventh-century Syrian fabric, shows a Muslim horse archer utilizing a short stirrup. 112 And S. M. Yū suf, whom White cites, merely stated that al-Muhallab'sinnovation was to makethe stirrups out of iron instead of wood as theypreviously had been made. The advantage, Yū suf surmised, was that wooden stirrups could be cut by the opponent in battle, while iron stirrups could not. 113 Yetitwas not the wooden stirrup itself that was vulnerable to being cut in battle, but the leather or cloth strap holding it. However, the difficulty of cutting the strap would seem to far outweigh anya dvantage this might give the opponent. Instead, the advantage of iron stirrups (or perhaps evenawooden stirrup with an iron band around it) is that theyw ould not give way so easily when the rider stood in them. The Arabs, liket he Central Asian nomads, used the short stirrup, which allowed them to stand in the stirrups with their derriere free of the saddle'sj ostlings. Thus, the legs acted as shock absorbers so the horseman'su pper body could remain stable while aiming and shooting a bow. Modern-day Mongolian horsemen display mastery of this skill while shooting a rifle at full gallop. 114 The long stirrup of western European knights in armor,w hich allowthe rider to stretch his legs to their fullest extent, and thus brace himself in the saddle, does not makef or accurate marksmanship eveni ft he horse were moving at slowspeed. 115 It is possible the stirrup then traversed to Frankish territory via North Africa with the Arabs during the later seventh and early eighth centuries. That route would explain whyW hite could find no appearance of the stirrup in Europe before the early eighth century and then only in Frankish territory.T hat is, the technological innovation of the stirrup did indeed move from east to west, buta cross North Africa to western Europe, not across Europe itself. Thus, the Franks could have acquired the idea of the stirrup in the eighth century from the very Muslims from whom theya re often credited with saving Western civilization. Yet, the kind of stirrup the Muslims used was not adequate for the heavy shock troops that developed later in Europe. It seems likely that it took many decades, perhaps longer,for the Muslim short stirrup to be turned into the European long stirrup. Brunner had accepted that Martel'sf orces fought on foot at the Battle of Poitiers but suggested that Martel was frustrated at not being able to followu pt he victory and quickly pursue the retreating Muslim army.T his frustration led him to decide in favorofcavalry.W hite accepted that the Franks were on foot in 732/3, but used an account of the battle of the Dyle in 891, century,only 17% to 18% can be identified as horsemen. Of these, less than 1% have stirrups. 121 Finally,o ne should remember that the best horses in Europe could be found in Spain as a result of crossbreeding between the indigenous Iberian horses and the Arabians brought in by the Muslims. 122 Theyw ere both fast and strong. In addition, the Spanish continued to use the short stirrup, not the long stirrup, at least until the sixteenth century. 123 If Charles Martel was the first who ''fully grasped the possibilities inherent in the stirrup,'' then one wonders whyt he short stirrup, which was no good for the heavy-armor warfare that developed further north, continued to be used in Spain. 124 *** type, his equipment was not so expensive.I naddition, he was paid wages by the government upon fulfillment of his obligations. 126 It would appear that the pomeshchik did not need to support himself entirely offh is estates. Whyt hen wast he military land grant introduced into Muscovy? Muscovy in the fourteenth and pre-Ivan III fifteenth century was not a landowning power; it was a tax collector of goods that traversed the trade routes. Under Ivan III, Muscovy acquired more land. The problem in late fifteenth-and early sixteenth-century Muscovy was not too little land or inhabited land, as has often been asserted, but too much. That is, the grand prince was acquiring relatively large amounts of newt erritory without anyw ay of administering it under the old kormlenie system. Pomest'e,w hich gav e the holder a permanent and vested interest in the land under his control, may have been the answer.I no ther words, the problem for the grand prince may not have been to acquire more land to satisfy the ''land-hungry'' dvorianstvo butt ofi nd a better way of administering land already held, as well as newland being acquired in increasing amounts.
It is my contention that the institution of military land grants in the medievalW est, Byzantium, Seljū qa nd Ilkhanate Persia, the Ottoman Empire, and Muscovy as well as among the Ayyubids, the Mamluks, the Buyids, and the pre-Buyid Arabs is not an indigenous development in each case, completely independent from each other,b ut, instead, completely interrelated. If my contention is correct, then it means that service land tenure is not typical of certain kinds of societies at certain stages of development. Rather it is typical of these particular societies because of more or less direct borrowing of one from the other.
The horse archer with a short stirrup was the standard south and east of a line running from Spain in the West, eastward across the Mediterranean, then north along the eastern boundary of the Byzantine Empire, across the Black Sea, and through eastern Europe to the Baltic Sea. The mounted knight with long stirrup was the standard north and west of that line. The battle of Poitiers in 732/3 was fought between Muslim horse archers (unorganized) and European foot soldiers who used their horses only as transportation to the battle site. From the ninth through eleventh centuries, the Turks relied heavily on horse archers to defeat Byzantine armies in Anatolia. 127 fundamental improvement on the Muslim side, but the Europeans had now developed a heavy cavalry made up of armored knights. In the thirteenth century,A lexander Nevskii'sh orse archers met Teutonic mounted knights. When the Mongols came, the battle for Rus' was between horse archers on both sides, butt he Mongols held a decided superiority in organization. The battle of Leignitz was between organized horse archers and unorganized mounted knights. Eventually the gunpowder revolution and organized strategy using both cavalry and infantry gav e the Europeans the advantage. But the point is that the military land grant to support the cavalry social class and to administer newly acquired regions was the key component of societies on both sides of the Muslim-Christian frontier. Crimea to his grandson. 131 Likewise, the transformation of the nomadic Mongol elite to sedentarianism in the Ilkhanate was marked by the establishment of iqt . ā ' by Ghazan in the early fourteenth century.
We historians may have been looking at the question of the medievalmilitary-industrial complexf rom the wrong end. We hav e taken western European ''feudalism,'' whateverw eu nderstand by that term, as the standard against which the service land tenure in all other societies is to be compared. Instead, the Muslim system of military land grants to support light cavalry (horse archers), characterized by the short stirrup, has a better claim to being the standard from the seventh through the seventeenth centuries. The Muslims borrowed cavalry tactics and the stirrup from Central Asian nomads and added the military land grant to support their version of the horse archer and to administer newly conquered territories.
The western European form of military land grant to support heavy cavalry,c haracterized by the long stirrup, was an anomaly within this system. The western Europeans acquired the stirrup after the Muslims, and perhaps from them. The military revolution in tactics in western Europe, although we cannot date it precisely,o ccurred after contact with the Muslims in the West. Western Europeans did not master the horse archer techniques of the Muslims. Instead, theydevised another form of military tactic that eventually clashed directly with the Muslims in the Middle East during the Crusades.
Muscovite warriors did master the horse archer techniques, probably as a result of direct contact with the nomads of the steppe. And Muscovy'ssystem of military land grants, pomest'e,coincides with that of the Muslim system of iqt . ā '. Pomest'e and iqt . ā ' were institutions that served the same twofunctions: maintenance of a standing cavalry and administration of newly acquired territories. And the structural similarities between them are too close for us to continue to ignore.
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